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Re: [tor-bugs] #20212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources
#20212: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources
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Reporter: gacar | Owner: tbb-team
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: unspecified
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: guard-discovery | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by mikeperry):
* milestone: => Tor: unspecified
Comment:
Unlike the generic or custom-built Tor client case (CDNs and status
pingers will likely customize their Tor client for performance), Tor
Browser specifies a SOCKS username and password for url bar domain
isolation. When this u+p is set, we should be able to safely limit the
number of onion hostnames for a single SOCKS username + password to some
low number (5? 10?).
Do we need a separate limit if third party hidden services are malicious
and deliberately fail either HSDIR, IP, or RP attempts in a way that
causes the client to retry them? Maybe there should be a total rend
circuit limit per SOCKS u+p?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20212#comment:5>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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