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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features
#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor
Browser's security features
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Reporter: isabela | Owner: antonela
Type: project | Status: assigned
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201810 | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor17
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Comment (by gk):
Replying to [comment:37 arthuredelstein]:
> Replying to [comment:34 gk]:
> > The security risks don't map the the underlying transport ot its
security being used. The security risks we try to tackle are to a large
part due to the *content* that gets transferred. Someone injecting this
content on the path from server to user is an important risk but just one
of those we need to defend against. This binding the security state to
HTTP/HTTPS is not sufficient. Moreover, the strongest security we want to
provide is something like the current "safest" option we have. We won't be
able to enable this by default probably forever as the breakage is too
high, irrespective of the transport being used.
>
> We have discussed this issue previously, but I wanted to try laying it
out in more detail and see if that helps to clarify the different
approaches. :)
> Design (2), proposed in comment:33:
> || || Unblocked || Blocked ||
> || HTTP || || WebFont, blob, SVG, scripts, WebGL, Video, Audio,
WebAudio, MathML, JIT ||
> || HTTPS || WebFont, blob, SVG, scripts, WebGL, Video, Audio, WebAudio,
MathML, JIT || ||
Just reply to this item: That's not proposed in comment:33. Here is what
antonela wrote:
{{{
Again: I think that the best way to improve the security slider is
removing the slider component. As mentioned before, the slider is a UI
artifact that doesn't add any value to this settings. Instead, it confuses
users about their benefits on upgrade or downgrade.
If we could simplify the security settings into a boolean option, we will
follow the current Firefox approach on settings both in desktop and in
mobile, and we will help users by making it easier to understand the
trade-off: "Do I trust in this site?"
}}}
So, comment:33 proposes to reduce the slider from three options to two *in
general* and bind all the security features to the transport. But you want
to keep "safest", "safer", and "standard" but redo the "safer" option. So,
these are different things.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25658#comment:38>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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