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Re: [tor-bugs] #32088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal 271 - straightforward improvements

#32088: Proposal 271 - straightforward improvements
------------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  Jaym              |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement       |         Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High              |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor      |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal            |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec prop271  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                    |         Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm             |        Sponsor:
------------------------------+------------------------------------
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Here are some initial comments based on reading the patch and the email,
 based on the assumption that the email is right, and that the patch does
 what the email says it should do.

 Should `next_sampled_idx` persist across runs or be recalculated when we
 load guards?  Right now it seems to start at 0 every time Tor starts.
 Maybe we should also re-calculate the sampled_idx values to be a dense
 array when we save/load the state, so that we aren't leaking more
 information than we intend to.

 The patch will also need:
   * a short proposal.  It can mostly be based on Florentin's email.
   * a patch to guard-spec.txt.
   * tests for the changed behavior.
   * a "changes" file (see doc/HACKING/)
   * editing so that "make check-spaces" passes.
   * Updates to the documentation and names of all the functions whose
 behavior has changed. (For example,
 sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards` no longer does that the function's
 name implies or the documentation says.)

 How much of that do the original authors want to do, and how much should
 we pick up?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32088#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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