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Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: New design for client -- server protocol for Snowflake
#29206: New design for client -- server protocol for Snowflake
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Reporter: cohosh | Owner: cohosh
Type: task | Status:
| needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Circumvention/Snowflake | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: anti-censorship-roadmap-september | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 6
Reviewer: dcf | Sponsor:
| Sponsor28-must
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Comment (by cohosh):
Replying to [comment:34 dcf]:
> In any case, 5 seconds strikes me as way way too short for a liveness
timer. We'll be throwing away good proxies all the time. The fact that tor
is requesting new SOCKS connections indicates that we're signaling some
failure condition upward that we shouldn't be, I think; I would check that
out first.
Replying to [comment:36 teor]:
> Some users even struggle with Tor's 10-30 second timeouts, because they
are on really slow links.
> Even mobile from Australia to Europe can take a few seconds.
So Tor's timeout is 10-30 seconds? That seems like our problem here then.
If the SOCKS connection to the PT closes after not being able to bootstrap
in 10-30 seconds, then we only get one shot to bootstrap fully with the
first snowflake we get. Otherwise the user gets a warning that there's
something wrong with the network and has to restart the bootstrap process
manually (which may again fail). Any thoughts on how to solve this other
than multiplexing and trying to send the data through multiple snowflakes
at once?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29206#comment:37>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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