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Re: [tor-bugs] #1789 [Tor Relay]: Wake-up from Hibernation Occurs Day 1 Each Month
#1789: Wake-up from Hibernation Occurs Day 1 Each Month
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Reporter: BarkerJr | Type: defect
Status: new | Priority: minor
Milestone: Tor: 0.2.2.x-final | Component: Tor Relay
Version: Tor: 0.2.2.14-alpha | Keywords:
Parent: |
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Comment(by mwenge):
Replying to [comment:14 arma]:
> My first thought is that our calculation for when to wake up is wrong.
Notice how we never go into hard hibernation, just soft. Also notice how
we aren't waking up at exactly midnight on day 1 -- we start a few hours
in, like we think we're leaving 99% of the period available because last
month we only used 99% of our bandwidth, which means this month we should
wake up way earlier to make sure to use all of it.
When you have a AccountingMax of 200GB your soft limit is 190GB, and the
last set of spam stats show this is the threshold the router hit around
the 7th. However it never reached its hard limit, and its hard to think of
a router with such an AccountingMax that could, because hitting the soft
limit means you don't open new connections - just maintain old ones. The
router's traffic dropped off and it read another 2GB or so. At that rate
it would not have reached its AccountingMax for the month.
So if you're correct that the next accounting interval is based on the
rate at which you reached your hard limit rather than your soft one then
all large capacity routers must have this problem. My reading of the code
is that you are right: n_seconds_active_in_interval appears to be the
total time for which we were reading/writing bytes and that, together with
the bytes read/written, is used to calculate our expected bandwidth usage.
So it looks like Tor needs to tune the 'soft limit is 95% of
AccountingMax' rule to tolerate servers that specify a high capacity.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1789#comment:15>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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