[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #1776 [Tor Client]: Allow regular relays to be used as bridges
#1776: Allow regular relays to be used as bridges
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
Reporter: Sebastian | Owner: arma
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords:
Parent: |
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
Comment(by arma):
Sebastian: for context, I originally put in the if (old_router) check just
as a defensive programming measure, so we don't look at *old_router if
it's NULL.
The first case that comes to mind where old_router could be NULL is if Tor
has a bug somewhere such that routerlist->desc_digest_map and
routerlist->identity_map get out of sync. We don't know of bugs now, but
that's no promise they won't be introduced later.
I guess the second case that you're pointing out is if somebody can create
a sha1 collision on structured data (relay descriptors here), such that
they give you a descriptor A for relay identity B, and then when you're
fetching a bridge descriptor for bridge identity C they give you a new
descriptor D signed by C whose hash matches the hash of A. That would
cause you to trigger the assert and exit.
I have to say, I'm not much worried about that DoS vulnerability. Somebody
should audit the Tor code in their spare time for other such cases, to get
a sense of how many there are, but I bet there are lots.
Nick, can you give some insight here? How pedantic should we be?
bug1776_v3 seems like it resolves the issues, and it has an assert that
shouldn't be triggered except if we have a bug or a bad assumption about
sha1. Good enough?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1776#comment:22>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs