Re: [tor-bugs] #1952 [Tor Relay]: Bw Weights error 1 for case Case 3b

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <torproject-admin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#1952: Bw Weights error 1 for case Case 3b
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma       |       Owner:  mikeperry         
     Type:  defect     |      Status:  new               
 Priority:  normal     |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component:  Tor Relay  |     Version:                    
 Keywords:             |      Parent:                    
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------

Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:4 arma]:
 > I would say we should pick the situation where exit+guards can be used
 in the first hop. One of the main security goals of Tor is unlinkability,
 and the degree of unlinkability that Tor can provide is related to the
 number of possible entry points in the network.

 To improve unlinkability, you would need to increase the number of entry
 nodes that ''each client'' might use (currently fixed at 3, for good
 reason), not increase the total number of entry nodes in the network.  The
 way to improve anonymity here is to ''reduce'' the number of possible
 entry nodes in the network, thereby increasing the number of clients per
 entry node (and therefore providing more cover traffic for each client's
 circuits).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1952#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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