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[tor-bugs] #3973 [TorBrowserButton]: REQ: New Identity option; do not close current tabs (re fast circuit).



#3973: REQ: New Identity option; do not close current tabs (re fast circuit).
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 Reporter:  joyton            |          Owner:  mikeperry
     Type:  enhancement       |         Status:  new      
 Priority:  normal            |      Milestone:           
Component:  TorBrowserButton  |        Version:           
 Keywords:                    |         Parent:           
   Points:                    |   Actualpoints:           
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 To whom it may concern,

 The current TorButton (or is not now called TorBrowser Botton?) "New
 Identity" feature when activated, closes all currently open tabs to
 protect from a variety of attacks with respect to linking old and new
 "identities" (i.e., pseudonyms). At least that is how I understand the
 current state of TorButton.

 I think that feature is grand for times I want to use my anon e-mail as
 user XYZ, after visiting a forum as user ABC. However, I think we should
 be given an option as to whether we want to simply try to find a faster
 circuit via. New Identity vs. closing all currently open tabs for the sake
 of anonymity.

 I see the use of New Identity via. TorButton as so:

 Use case 1: New IP address (exit node) for anonymity between pseudonyms.

 Use case 2: New circuit in an attempt to find a faster circuit.


 Note:
 I realise I can use the New Identity button via. Vidalia to try and find a
 faster circuit without closing all tabs, however, I do not always use Tor
 with Vidalia ...

 Thank you

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3973>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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