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Re: [tor-bugs] #9349 [Flashproxy]: flashproxy facilitator: Allow clients to specify transports
#9349: flashproxy facilitator: Allow clients to specify transports
----------------------------+-------------------
Reporter: asn | Owner: dcf
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Flashproxy | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords:
Actual Points: | Parent ID: #7167
Points: |
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Comment (by dcf):
Replying to [comment:18 asn]:
> Replying to [comment:16 dcf]:
> > `options.relays` should be indexed not by complete transport chains,
but by transport chains excluding their last element. It should be
possible for an obfs3|websocket client to talk to an obfs3|tcp relay, if
there is a proxy that speaks both websocket and tcp. To be specific you
should key by the tuple `("obfs3",)` and not `("obfs3", "websocket")`.
> >
>
> Hm, would this functionality work currently?
>
> To have an obfs3|websocket client talk to an obfs3|tcp relay, doesn't
the flashproxy have to first strip off the websocket frame? Does this
happen currently? It was my impression that there is a bridge-side
websocket transport that strips off the websocket frames.
Yes, the way it works currently is that the proxy strips off the WebSocket
container from the client, and adds its own WebSocket container again to
the relay. The WebSocket API doesn't even give us visibility into the raw
WebSocket stream; all we see are the bytes that are inside it.
Remember, a flash proxy isn't tunnelling a clientâserver WebSocket
connection between client and relay. There isn't even any WebSocket client
code in flashproxy-client. Rather, the flash proxy transports
clientâserver Tor TLS between client and relay, and it does this by means
of separate, independent WebSocket connections to client and relay.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9349#comment:28>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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