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Re: [tor-bugs] #9206 [Tor]: 'Guard' flags only assigned to first nodes started in a private Tor network
#9206: 'Guard' flags only assigned to first nodes started in a private Tor network
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
Reporter: karsten | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-auth tor-relay simulation
Actual Points: | testing
Points: | Parent ID:
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
Changes (by ln5):
* status: new => needs_review
Comment:
Based on looking at how the directory authorities vote Guard in a
Chutney network (without bandwidth authority data), generating 'state'
files for relays for which we want to influence Guard seems best.
Writing something high, like 10*1024*1024, for the following values in
the 'state file for a relay will give it Fast and Guard.
>>>>
BWHistoryReadValues 10485760
BWHistoryReadMaxima 10485760
BWHistoryWriteValues 10485760
BWHistoryWriteMaxima 10485760
>>>>
Making sure that a relay does _not_ get Guard is less straight forward
-- simply setting something low will make fast_bandwidth_kb become so
low that they will still be fast. Also, when relays advertize zero
bandwidth, things become weird.
See bug9206 in my Chutney repo for a quick'n'dirty change to
tools/bootstrap-network.sh which does this for relays (not dirauths
and client).
If we think that this would be useful to Chutney users we could make
Node.__init__() take a "flag_hints" parameter saying things like FH_Guard
and generate a fake history accordingly instead of having the bootstrap
script doing it. Let me know.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9206#comment:11>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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