[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #9206 [Tor]: 'Guard' flags only assigned to first nodes started in a private Tor network
#9206: 'Guard' flags only assigned to first nodes started in a private Tor network
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
Reporter: karsten | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-auth tor-relay simulation
Actual Points: | testing
Points: | Parent ID:
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
Comment (by ln5):
Replying to [comment:13 robgjansen]:
> We were at one point but it must have gotten removed. Should we be using
these? Would this allow us to specify guard flags?
No. I'm asking because since getting guard depends not only on (weighted)
uptime, but also on whether you're Fast or not, which is influenced by
either bandwidth files or, if those are not present, what the relays say
themselves.
My suggested solution, based on a Chutney use case, was to make relays
brag about high speed which in a network where dir auths don't have
bandwidth files will make them all Guards.
The reason that I dropped the "brute force solution" (forcing flags on
relays by configuring dir auths to just set the bloody flag, goddamit) is
that in Shadow, there seems to be no way of refer to a relay before the
network is started. I wasn't pondering the idea of adding a dir auth
configuration option making _all_ relays Guards, Stable or whatever. Would
that be useful to you, Rob?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9206#comment:14>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs