Re: [tor-bugs] #15482 [Tor]: Don't surprise users with new circuits in the middle of browsing

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#15482: Don't surprise users with new circuits in the middle of browsing
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:           |      Owner:  yawning
  mikeperry              |     Status:  needs_revision
         Type:           |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
  enhancement            |    Version:  Tor: unspecified
     Priority:  normal   |   Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-wants, tor-core,
    Component:  Tor      |  PostFreeze027, TorCoreTeam201509
   Resolution:           |  Parent ID:
Actual Points:           |
       Points:           |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by nickm):

 Oh, and I'm not sure it's right to ditch the randomness here either; I
 think it helps.  (Rationale: in unpatched Tor, any adversary on the
 circuit can only learn, from the circuit close time, that the circuit is
 finally used for no streams, *and* that the time at which the first stream
 was attached to the circuit.  But this is trivial for them to infer from
 traffic patterns anyway.  With this patch, such an adversary can also
 learn a latest-bound for the time at which the last stream opened, which
 wasn't visible to them before unless the streams are pretty isolated in
 time.  I don't know if we should be worrying about this or not, but it
 deserve's a moment's contemplation IMO)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15482#comment:38>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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