#15254: Enable hidden-service statistics by default
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
Reporter: dgoulet | Owner:
Type: | Status: reopened
enhancement | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
Priority: major | Version:
Component: Tor | Keywords: SponsorR tor-hs stats
Resolution: | TorCoreTeam201509 PostFreeze027
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
Comment (by arma):
Replying to [comment:17 cypherpunks]:
> Similar to ExitPortStatistics, these involve examining and processing
user-controlled data in ways that aren't necessary for normal operation.
Similar to ExitPortStatistics (which aren't), they should not be enabled
by default.
This is an interesting one. I agree that not all stats should be on by
default. This particular stat gets a lot of discussion in our 2010 paper:
http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wecsr10measuring-tor
But I can also point to other stats, which are on by default, like the
per-country client counts, or the per-country directory fetch counts, or
the deciles for how long consensus fetches take to finish. I think the
stats under discussion here are squarely in the latter category -- and
probably quite a bit safer than some of the stats that we collect, and
have collected basically forever.
> Any reasonably imaginable use of these is satisfiable without having
them on by default. In fact, for those purposes mentioned, a single
approximate measurement is enough.
Alas, I disagree with this part too. Having longitudinal answers is
critical to knowing whether we're interpreting the data correctly, and to
knowing whether external changes have affected these statistics.
As just one example, when the botnet showed up in August 2013, my first
thought was that the client count graph was broken or was being fed
inaccurate data by some jerk who was just messing with our stats. But when
I saw a corresponding increase in directory bytes
(https://metrics.torproject.org/dirbytes.html) it became much more
convincing that indeed we had an extra 5 million clients that week. And it
turns out that the 'directory bytes fetched' graph has continued to be
useful for us to understand the trends of the botnet after that month.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:23>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs