[tor-bugs] #20082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#20082: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services
------------------------------+--------------------
     Reporter:  twim          |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement   |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium        |  Milestone:
    Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal        |   Keywords:  tor-hs
Actual Points:                |  Parent ID:
       Points:                |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:                |
------------------------------+--------------------
 At the moment descriptor is getting posted at MIN_REND_INITIAL_POST_DELAY
 (30) seconds after onion service initialization.
 For the use case of real-time one-time services (like OnionShare, etc) one
 has to wait for 30 seconds until this onion service can be reached.
 Besides, if a client tries to reach the service before its descriptor is
 ever published, tor client gets stuck preventing user from reaching this
 service after descriptor is published. Like this:
 {{{ Could not pick one of the responsible hidden service directories to
 fetch descriptors, because we already tried them all unsuccessfully. }}}

 I propose to lower MIN_REND_INITIAL_POST_DELAY to 3-5 secs for ephemeral
 services. It seems to be enough for one-shot services to stabilize.
 Not sure if it's really bad to do so - tell me if it is. If it's not good
 idea to make such short delay for all ephemeral services, we can pass this
 delay as a parameter for ADD_ONION command so that applications which need
 low delay can tune it.

 Please see a patch below for making this delay as short as 3 seconds for
 ephemeral services.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20082>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs