[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-bugs] #13727 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB should not distribute Tor Browser's default bridges

#13727: BridgeDB should not distribute Tor Browser's default bridges
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------
 Reporter:  isis                        |          Owner:  isis
     Type:  defect                      |         Status:
                                        |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium                      |      Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB        |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                      |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-dist, tbb-bridges  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                              |         Points:
 Reviewer:                              |        Sponsor:
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------
Changes (by dcf):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Our current workaround for this is to ask the operators of default bridges
 to block their ORPort with a firewall, so the bridge isn't considered live
 by the bridge authority. Most of the current default obfs4 bridges are
 configured this way. Having an open ORPort can only be a liability for an
 obfs4 bridge; it creates the possibility that someone will connect to the
 ORPort using vanilla Tor, get DPIed, and burn the whole IP address (see
 also #7349).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13727#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs