[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #22805 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove or_circuit_t.is_first_hop, because it's not accurate any more
#22805: Remove or_circuit_t.is_first_hop, because it's not accurate any more
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner: nickm
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.2.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: technical-debt, security-review, | Actual Points: .3
review-group-23 |
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: asn | Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by teor):
I think we can take out all the code that deals with CREATE_FAST,
including `cfe6b444d652464b0b6bb18b4a4a24b0cfb0da81`, and just check for a
non-zero identity digest.
If a connecting peer has a zero identity digest, it's a client/bridge, if
it doesn't, it's a relay. (A listening peer is always a relay.
Interestingly, bridges look like relays to clients, but look like clients
to public relays.)
If a connecting peer uses CREATE_FAST, it might be an old client, or a
bootstrapping client, or a bootstrapping relay (on 0.2.9 and later).
But I'm unsure what happens after the initial circuit, when a
bootstrapping relay `A` uses CREATE_FAST to `B`.
Does `A` authenticate to the listening relay `B` once `A` has a consensus?
Or, if `A` has authenticated `B`, but `B` never authenticated `A`:
* does `A` discard its early connection to `B`?
* does `A` use its early connections for client extends to `B`, but `B`
doesn't use that connection for client extends to `A`?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22805#comment:14>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs