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Re: [tor-bugs] #23493 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning
#23493: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning
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Reporter: teor | Owner: teor
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.2.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6 | Actual Points: 0.5
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by asn):
Here is a short review:
- Not a big fan of poking into the guts of service with
`service->config.is_single_onion` to figure out if SoS or not. I suggest
now that we are more serious about this feature to use a function like
`int service_is_single_onion(hs_service_t *)`.
- `direct_conn_inout` is a weird variable name. Why `inout` and not `out`?
Also let's improve variable naming so that this `BUG` makes a bit more
sense `if (BUG(direct_conn && direct_conn_inout && !*direct_conn_inout))
{`.
- `7c3ba98cd` is a bit sketch. I wonder how come that was not needed
before. If it was not needed, is it just defense-in-depth? Can we add a
non-fatal assert to make sure it never triggers? Also, is
`extend_info_is_a_configured_bridge()` the right thing to do? What happens
if the bridge has a PT on a different address than the bridge?
- It's kinda scary that there is no unittests for any of the SoS HSv3
logic.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23493#comment:13>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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