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Re: [tor-bugs] #27636 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion indicator for non-self-signed but non-trusted sites
#27636: .onion indicator for non-self-signed but non-trusted sites
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Reporter: o-- | Owner: tbb-team
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: ux-team | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by o--):
If I correctly understand the reasoning in #23247 a warning should be
displayed if the certificate is "incorrect" (ie. wrong CN), which is the
case in #13410. This might or might not be a good idea. Potentially it
could indicate a misconfiguration on the server side (for example wrong
virtual host).
The case reported in this ticket however is a "correct" but untrusted
certificate. In this case I really see no argument for treating it
differently than "correct" but self-signed.
But I agree that in general it is kind of difficult to define when the
user should be warned, even though the onion address provides the end-to-
end verified connection.
In both of those tickets it seems to me, that requiring the service
providers to "downgrade" to a self-signed certificate to get the green
connection without UI hassle is a step back. In this ticket the service
uses a custom CA which some users might already trust. In the #13410 the
site provides a certificate for the identical non-onion site (which is
correct and trusted). Both options feel like they are at least not worse
than a self-signed cert.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27636#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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