Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different
padlock states for .onion services
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  isabela                              |          Owner:
                                                 |  pospeselr
     Type:  project                              |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser             |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs,                     |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R                          |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Description changed by antonela:

Old description:

> = Background =
>
> Firefox (and other browsers) have created a set of states a site can have
> in relationship with ssl certificates, and how to communicate that to the
> user.
>
> Currently, Tor Browser doesn't communicate ideally to users that visit
> onion sites--i.e. http + onion looks really scary with lots of warnings!
> This is something that was discussed under #21321. We then realized that
> we should look at all the different state + .onion combinations, and
> carefully communicate what these mean to the user.
>
> = Objective =
>
> The work on this ticket is to map all the current states Firefox has for
> ssl certificates on the padlock, and from there start to build a new way
> to communicate these states when they are related to a .onion sites. We
> started mapping them here:
>
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KHkj2DpmFMB0mjHEfehD5ztY2L0lQzKNtZqct1TXbmg/edit
>
> Is still pending the most difficult part of the work, which is to define
> what to do for .onion sites on those states.

New description:

 = Background =

 Firefox (and other browsers) have created a set of states a site can have
 in relationship with ssl certificates, and how to communicate that to the
 user.

 Currently, Tor Browser doesn't communicate ideally to users that visit
 onion sites--i.e. http + onion looks really scary with lots of warnings!
 This is something that was discussed under #21321. We then realized that
 we should look at all the different state + .onion combinations, and
 carefully communicate what these mean to the user.

 = Objective =

 The work on this ticket is to map all the current states Firefox has for
 ssl certificates on the padlock, and from there start to build a new way
 to communicate these states when they are related to a .onion sites. We
 started mapping them here:

 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KHkj2DpmFMB0mjHEfehD5ztY2L0lQzKNtZqct1TXbmg/edit

 Is still pending the most difficult part of the work, which is to define
 what to do for .onion sites on those states.

 = Final Version =

 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bPrNLIl7Qy-
 sA7aTfElu80Xk2eXzTfH_5BGTOUDK8XU/edit

--

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23247#comment:82>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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