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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
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Reporter: gk | Owner: tbb-
| team
Type: task | Status:
| needs_revision
Priority: Very High | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, | Actual Points:
TorBrowserTeam201909 |
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
| Sponsor44-can
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Comment (by gk):
Replying to [comment:8 acat]:
[snip]
> == [DROP? might not be needed -> check]
> {{{
> + 988d41acfaca Bug 26456: HTTP .onion sites inherit previous page's
certificate information
> }}}
That's not clear yet, probably we don't need it. However, the current
state of our rebased .onion security expectations needs improvements.
Right now if you load an http:// .onion (you could pick one from
https://onion.torproject.org) the proper icon is shown in the URL bar.
But: clicking on the info box shows that the connection is not secure
which is a regression to the stable series. `URICanBeConsideredSecure()`
(in security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUIImpl.cpp) seems to be suspicious
here as it does not care about .onion or not.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30429#comment:64>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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