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Re: path selection despite exit policies

To: or-dev@freehaven.net
Subject: Re: path selection despite exit policies
From: Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>
Date: 07 Apr 2003 13:49:35 -0400
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On Mon, 2003-04-07 at 13:18, Roger Dingledine wrote:
 [...]
 
I say "E" (ports only) for now, and eventually either "A" (clients
tunnel DNS requests) or "C" (guess and check).  "D" (servers publish
"hostnames-that-are-me") seems to address an entirely orthogonal issue.

Actually, I'd suggest a combination of "A" and "C":  Client says (over
tunnel) "Connect me to forbidden.seul.org:80".  Server says (over
tunnel) "Request to 18.244.0.188:80 denied", resolving the IP *and*
rejecting it.

In the successful case, this is as fast as we have today.  In the
failing case, this is as fast as a name lookup would be.  It's still
possible for an attacker to return a bogus IP, but that's not a problem
(IMO) for tor to address: we're anonymity, not MITM prevention.

-- 
Nick

Follow-Ups:
- Re: path selection despite exit policies
  - From: Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>

References:
- path selection despite exit policies
  - From: Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>

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