Re: [tor-dev] Improved circuit-setup protocol [was: Re: Designing and implementing improved circuit-setup protocol [was: GSoC 2011]]

[Ian Goldberg <iang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Apr 07, 2011 at 11:20:00PM +0100, Steven J. Murdoch wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 07, 2011 at 06:13:45PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> > Oh!  Also, for a bit of redundancy, I'm thinking that the symmetric
> > crypto parts of the improved onion handshakes ought to be with a less
> > malleable mode of operation than the counter-mode stuff we do now.
> > Perhaps we could make use of an all-or-nothing mode of operation like
> > LIONESS or biIGE.  (They're both slower than counter mode, but for
> > purposes of CREATE cells, I don't think the hit will matter in
> > comparison with the cost of the public-key operations.)
> 
> This is another thing that triggers my crypto-spidey-sense. The
> particular problem that I'm thinking of is that for MAC-then-encrypt,
> only some modes of operation are secure (CTR is, CBC is not). In some
> ways, the malleability of CTR is a strength, and I'd be concerned that
> something else might be able to be leveraged in an attack.

But we're currently doing "encrypt", not "MAC-then-encrypt".  And we
should be doing "encrypt-then-MAC", in my opinion, which ensures the
ciphertext can't be undetectably messed with.

In any event, yes, crypto-spidey-sense.

   - Ian
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