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Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor

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Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
From: William Whyte <wwhyte@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2016 07:20:37 -0400
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> I'd imagine everyone in this thread knows this, but New Hope requires
> that "both parties use fresh secrets for each instantiation".

NTRUEncrypt, which has also been proposed for this, can be used with ephemeral or long-lived keys safely.

Cheers,

William

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References:
- Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
  - From: Jesse V
- Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
  - From: Yawning Angel
- Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
  - From: lukep
- Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
  - From: Yawning Angel
- Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
  - From: Jeff Burdges

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