On 2017-04-02 05:22, Jeremy Rand wrote: > (Thinking out loud.) It would be interesting to have some kind of > algorithm agility here. For example, a Tor client could send a > request for a Namecoin domain name, and the exit relay would return a > Namecoin merkle proof in the same way that it would return a DNSSEC > signature if were a DNS doman name. It certainly seems to be a good idea to design the cell format to be agnostic as to what kind of "proof data" is attached to the DNS response. As prop219 just wraps around the existing DNS-packet wire-format, it should already allow that, provided that Namecoin has a wire-format for the proof. Certainly out of scope for GSoC, but I'm wondering: Apart from running a full Namecoin node (and storing the whole blockchain) on every client/exit node/whatever, is there a privacy-preserving way to resolve a .bit domain, i.e. without an upstream node/resolver learning/logging exactly which domain was resolved? Regards, Daniel
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