On 12/07/15 22:48, John Brooks wrote: > 1.3. Other effects on proposal 224 > > An adversarial introduction point is not significantly more capable than a > hidden service directory under proposal 224. The differences are: > > 1. The introduction point maintains a long-lived circuit with the service > 2. The introduction point can break that circuit and cause the service to > rebuild it Regarding this second difference: the introduction point (cooperating with a corrupt middle node) could potentially try to discover the service's guard by repeatedly breaking the circuit until it was rebuilt through the corrupt middle node. Would it make sense to use vanguards here, as well as on rendezvous circuits? Cheers, Michael
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