Re: [tor-dev] Bitcoin-paid hidden meek relays?

[Henry de Valence <hdevalence@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 12/10/2015 08:35 PM, Jeff Burdges wrote:
> After we get Taler running then Taler becomes a payment option too :
> 	https://taler.net/
> Although that does not solve the suckage around using money in general.
> 
> Alternatively, one could build a Taler mint that uses an identifying
> document like a passport to open an account, but there after issues
> users a constant stream of anonymous tokens with which they can obtain
> new meek addresses.  Ain't clear if that's really such a great idea
> either though as countries do not really run short of passports.
> 
> Jeff

Hi Jeff,

By coincidence I picked up a brochure on Taler at the Post-Snowden
Crypto event yesterday in Brussels, advertising it as "electronic
payments *for a liberal society*" (emphasis in original). I don't know
very much about Taler, but I'm curious about some text in the brochure
from INRIA:

> Taler is an electronic payment system that was built with the goal
> of supporting taxation.  With Taler, the receiver of any form of
> payment is known, and the payment information comes attached with
> some data about what the payment was made for ... governments can
> use this data to tax businesses and individuals ... making tax
> evasion and black markets less viable.

For a user in a country where Tor is blocked, funding Tor bridges is,
by definition, a black market in that country.

Could you explain how you see this feature of Taler fitting with the
threat model bridges are meant to address?  Which governments should get
detailed data on donations to bridges, and *to whom* is "the receiver of
any form of payment" known?

Should this data be accessible to goverments in illiberal societies
(say, China) who block Tor, or just to governments in liberal societies
(say, France, where Taler is developed), who would never block Tor?

Thanks,
Henry de Valence

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