Re: [tor-dev] [Proposal 241] Resisting guard-turnover attacks [DRAFT]

["l.m" <ter.one.leeboi@xxxxxxxx>]

"Nick Mathewson" wrote:
>If the number of guards we have *tried* to connect to in
>the last PERIOD days is greater than 
>CANDIDATE_THRESHOLD, do not attempt to connect
>to any other guards; only attempt the ones we have 
>previously *tried* to connect to.

Torrc
 allows the use of multiple guards with numentryguards > 1. So if an 
adversary hasn't yet managed to compromise the guard this might lead to a
 DOS. The adversary may be interested in getting you to connect to *one*
 malicious guard at a time. It might be worth considering to perform a 
reach-ability test using a built circuit. I mention "built" because Tor 
wouldn't know if the connectable guard is adversary controlled. It might
 also be worth considering guards that successfully connect after a failure as 
suspect for a time. That is, they shouldn't be optimistically added to the list of guards unless absolutely needed.

>We need to make this play nicely with mobility.  When
>a user has three guards on port 9001 and they move
>to a firewall that only allows 80/443, we'd prefer that 
>they not simply grind to a halt.  If nodes are configured
>to stop when too many of their guards have gone away,
>this will confuse them.

If 80/443 are the least restricted types of connection maybe it would be a good idea to try n of those before stopping. If they work but other guards fail it might be a symptom of a fascist firewall to warn about.

>If people need to turn FascistFirewall on and off, great.
>But if they just clear their state file as a workaround,
>that's not so good.

If FacistFirewall is 1 with some ports specified, and state isn't empty, don't consider the disjoint guards contributing to thresholds?

>If we could tie guard choice to location, that would
>help a great deal, but we'd need to answer the question,
>"Where am I on the network", which is not so easy to
>do passively if you're behind a NAT.

If network location were the combination of physicaladdr+dnsname+subnet would it be so bad if you're behind a NAT and dnsname were unavailable?

--leeroy


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