Re: [tor-dev] Projects to combat/defeat data correlation

[Malard Joel <malardj2002@xxxxxxxxx>]

Sounds like a challenging problem, good luck.

In the case of the Harvard exam, the administration may have used some meta data that may not be under your control,  listing out all student taking an exam that day, asking teachers for a shortlist of their class jerks and clowns, checking for repeat offenders, finding which ones had downloaded TOR software, asking frat buddies and classmates. Someone willing to send a bomb threat just to avoid an exam may be more likely to brag after the fact, etc.

Cheers,

Joel


------------------------------
On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 7:16 PM PST Jim Rucker wrote:

>There was a story in the news recently of a Harvard student who used Tor to
>send a bomb threat to Harvard in order to cancel classes so he wouldn't
>have to take a test. He was apprehended within a day, which puts into
>question the anonymity of Tor.
>
>From my understanding (please correct me if I'm wrong) Tor has a weakness
>in that if someone can monitor data going into the relays and going out of
>the exit nodes then they can defeat the anonymity of tor by correlating the
>size and number of packets being sent to relays and comparing those that
>the packets leaving the exit nodes.
>
>Are there any projects in Tor being worked in to combat data correlation?
>For instance, relays the send/recv constant data rates continuously -
>capping data rates and padding partial or non-packets with random data to
>maintain the data rates

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