Re: [tor-dev] Projects to combat/defeat data correlation

[David Stainton <dstainton415@xxxxxxxxx>]

In that case would it then look like zero in $(organizational unit of
harvard) using tor and
one in $(organizational unit of harvard) using scramble suit?

I like the idea of the tor pluggable transport combiner... wherein we
could wrap a pseudo-random appearing obfuscation protocol (such as
obfs3, scramblesuit etc) in a white listed obfuscation protocol such
as http?, sshrproxy, hexchat etc.

I imagine the anonymity set would be much smaller for these combined
transports... fewer people using them.


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:54 PM, Matthew Finkel
<matthew.finkel@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 09:16:20PM -0600, Jim Rucker wrote:
>> Are there any projects in Tor being worked in to combat data correlation?
>> For instance, relays the send/recv constant data rates continuously -
>> capping data rates and padding partial or non-packets with random data to
>> maintain the data rates
>
> The very quick answer without providing much detail is that you may want
> to look at scramblesuit [0][1]. It doesn't try to provide constant
> throughput, but (as the website says) "we alter inter-arrival times and
> the transported protocol's packet length distribution". This isn't a
> perfect solution, and won't impress a GPA, but it's a start if you're
> dealing with a localized passive observer.
>
> - Matt
>
> [0] http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
> [1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/phw/scramblesuit.git
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