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Re: [tor-dev] Defending against guard discovery attacks by pinning middle nodes
11.07.2014 14:31, Ian Goldberg:
> On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 01:44:36PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Hey Nick,
>>
>> this mail is about the schemes we were discussing during the dev
>> meeting on how to protect HSes against guard discovery attacks (#9001).
>> (...)
HS stands for hidden-service, if I'm not mistaking.
>
> And similarly at the exit node: the exit will now know that circuits
> coming from the same middle are more likely to be the same client.
> That's a little more worrying to me than the above.
>
If the proposed change applies to hidden-services alone, "regular" usage
of Tor (Client > Guard > Middle > Exit > Destination) is not affected.
My reading was that the middle node for hidden-service connections are
kept longer.
Could anyone please clarify the proposed change?
Regards,
Sebastian G.
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