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Re: [tor-dev] Bi-directional families in Onionoo and consensus weight as measure of relayed bandwidth



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Hi leeroy and Virgil,

I'm replying inline.

On 02/07/15 14:06, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> One proposal I've liked is to socially discourage asymmetrical
> families by giving them with bad badges on Roster.  If A says B is
> part of their family but B doesn't reciprocate, A gets a penalty to
> their bandwidth points.

Maybe don't go as far as penalizing relay operators for attempting to
configure a relay family and not succeeding at it.  Keeping family
configurations updated is not exactly trivial.  And if the effect is
that relay operators stop configuring families at all, that's not what
we wanted, either.

It would be good to point out configuration problems with family
settings and help operators debug them easily.

> I think right now the proposals are to either:
> 
> (1) move forward using Observed Bandwidth for everything.  And when
> it gets spoofed we must accept it and can talk about ways of
> improving it.
> 
> (2) use consensus weight as a proxy for "real observed bandwidth".
> 
> Question: What is the downside (if any), of using Consensus Weight
> as the sole measure of bandwidth points?

I still think it's a good idea, but I'm curious what others think.

> -V
> 
> On Thursday, July 2, 2015, l.m <ter.one.leeboi@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>> The major problem with ticket 16276 is that it isn't a fix (as
>> you seek here). It just moves the current implementation into the
>> details document rather than being done in the node index. I
>> don't think you *can* fix it as you seek. Bi-directionality isn't
>> an enforceable property. The spec makes no guarantee. The
>> internet makes no guarantee. You might as well remove the family
>> property entirely than try to do what you suggest.
>> 
>> What you propose isn't possible by the properties of tor's
>> network. The best you can do is take a measurement and hope it
>> applies to all views of the network. I made some comments
>> alluding to this in 16276. I would happily work on the ticket if
>> it actually presented a solution.

I started implementing something here and will report back on the
ticket as soon as I'm more convinced that it works.

Thanks, everyone!

All the best,
Karsten



>> 
>> Comments appreciated. --leeroy
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing
> list tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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> 

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