Thus spake Georg Koppen (g.koppen@xxxxxxxxx): > >> And why having again add-ons that can probably be toggled on/off and > >> are thus more error-prone than just having an, say, Tor anon mode? > >> Or is this already included in the Tor anon mode but only separated > >> in the blog post for explanatory purposes? > > > > If we operate by upgrading private browsing mode, we'll effectively > > have the "toggle" in a place where users have already been trained by > > the UI to go for privacy. Torbutton would become an addon that is only > > active in private browsing mode. > > Okay. That means there is no additional toggling of Torbutton in this > enhanced private mode. The user just enters it and Torbutton is running > and doing its job and if the user does not want it anymore she does not > toggle anything but leaves this enhanced private browsing mode and > that's it, right? That's correct. If the user wants their regular private browsing mode back, they would presumably uninstall the extension. > >> If one user requests > >> google.com, mail.google.com and other Google services within the 10 > >> minutes interval (I am simplifying here a bit) without deploying TLS the > >> exit is still able to connect the whole activity and "sees" which > >> services that particular user is requesting/using. Even worse, if the > >> browser session is quite long there is a chance of recognizing that user > >> again if she happens to have the same exit mix more than once. Thus, I > >> do not see how that helps avoiding linkability for users that need/want > >> strong anonymity while surfing the web. Would be good to get that > >> explained in some detail. Or maybe I am missing a point here. > > > > We also hope to provide a "New Identity" functionality to address the > > persistent state issue, but perhaps this also should be an explicit > > responsibility of the mode rather than the addon.. > > Hmmm... If that is the answer to my questions then there is nothing like > avoiding getting tracked by exit mixes in the concept offered in the > blog post. Okay. That is not entirely true. Because identifiers would be linked to top-level urlbar domain, gone are the days where exits could insert an iframe or web-bug into any arbitrary page and use that to track the user for the duration of the session, regardless of page view. Instead, they would be pushed back to doing some sort of top-level redirect (which we hope would be way more visible), or maybe not even that, depending on how we define redirects with respect to "top-level". So no, we are not completely abandoning exits as an adversary with this threat model. If I'm wrong about something, or you think there are still attacks exits can perform that we should address somehow, let me know. > How should the "New Identity" functionality work? Is > that identity generated automatically after a certain amount of time has > passed or does a user have to click manually on a button every time? I don't know the answer here. This may vary by browser and use case. For a communications-suite style use case, I think we probably want to detect inactivity and ask the user if they want to clear state, because communications-suites are heavy and a pain to relaunch (hence once opened, they probably will stay open). For something lighter, like Chrome's Incognito, we may just rely on the user to leave the mode. This divergence is one of the reasons I didn't mention the feature in the blog post. If you want to track what solution we ultimately deploy for TBB, here is the ticket you should follow: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/523 > >> Assuming I understood TorButton's > >> Smart-Spoofing option properly: Why is it not applied to the > >> referer/window.name anymore? In other words: Why is the referer (and > >> window.name) not kept if the user surfs within one domain (let's say > >> from example.com to foo.example.com and then to foo.bar.example.com)? > > > > I don't really understand this question. The referer should be kept in > > these cases. > > That sounds good. Then we probably had just different concepts of SOP in > mind. I was thinking about > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-abarth-origin-09 (see: section 3 and > 4). That would treat http://example.com, http://foo.example.com and > http://foo.bar.example.com as different origins (let alone mixing > "http://"; and "https://"; and having different ports). Yeah. The reality is we're basically picking an arbitrary heuristic for squelching this information channel to find some sweet spot that minimizes breakage for maximal gain. True same-origin policy may or may not be relevant here. Since I personally believe any heuristic squelch is futile against bad actors, I haven't thought terribly hard about the best "sweet spot" policy. I just took what Kory Kirk came up with for a GSoC project and tweaked it slightly to make it symmetric: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2148 This policy will appear as a non-default option in 1.4.0 (it is already in 1.3.x-alpha), but I think we should make a real decision about the behavior soon, because having an option just creates a fingerprinting opportunity as I said in the blog post. I believe the fingerprinting effect of an option to be worse than doing nothing at all to referer, since it is global linkability, not just an information channel between two parties: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3100 I'm still pretty convinced the best solution for Tor is "leave referer alone", at least until someone shows me the breakage results of a thorough crawl (which would include web-app site use). > > Hence it doesn't make sense to "clear" them like cookies. Instead, It > > makes more sense to prohibit information transmission through them in > > certain cases. > > I am not sure about that as "clearing" them for *certain contexts* seems > a good means to prohibit information transmission *in these contexts*: > If there isn't any information it cannot be transmitted (at least not by > referer or windows.name). Perhaps. Right before I abandoned the toggle model for torbutton, one of the last fixes I did to it was to "clear" window.name on toggle: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1968 I now believe that is the wrong way to think about things. I think the better solution is to "clear" window.name when the user enters a new url in the urlbar, which gets covered by making window.name behave like referer in all cases: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3414 > Another question came to my mind: You seem to be at pains not to break > parts of the web even in the anon mode even if that boils down to not > implement features that would better fit the needs for people looking > for unlinkability (one thing that comes to my mind here would be having > a context being tab dependent additionally). Why? Why not saying: "This > is Tor's anon mode. It is meant for people that strive for unlinkability > and might break some functionality. You may still use Tor in normal or > private browsing mode though (providing no or less unlinkability on the > browser level)." Do you think that's not worth the effort as Tor's IP > unlinkability is enough here (especially combined with the things you > suggested in the blog post)? I do not know Tor's user base very well but > could imagine that it contains a lot of users that would like to have > more unlinkability than the "we do not want to break any (or almost any) > part of the web for a better anonymity" fraction. I wish I had better science to give you here on the trade-off we're going for, but the reality is that we're best-guessing over a very complex cost/benefit landscape. We do know for a fact that the easier Tor is to use (which includes installation, configuration, overall intuitiveness/"familiarity", compatibility, and performance), the more people will use it regularly. We also know for a fact that the more people use Tor, the better the baseline privacy, anonymity, and censorship resistance properties all become. Hence, I tend to make decisions in favor of the usability direction over minor details, especially ones that don't really prevent bad actors/adversaries from accomplishing their goals. The need for science especially comes in on the fingerprinting arena. Some fingerprinting opportunities may not actually be appealing to adversaries. Some may even appear appealing in theory, but in practice would be noticeable to the user, too noisy, and/or too error-prone. Hence I called for more panopticlick-style studies, especially of Javascript features, in the blog post. -- Mike Perry Mad Computer Scientist fscked.org evil labs
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