Re: [tor-dev] Discussion on the crypto migration plan of the identity keys of Hidden Services

[Maxim Kammerer <mk@xxxxxx>]

On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 4:10 PM, George Kadianakis <desnacked@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> FWIW, it seems that the I2P folks took a similar approach:
> http://www.i2p2.de/naming.html
> http://www.i2p2.de/hosts.txt
>
> Unfortunately, I don't know how well that system has worked for them
> so far. It seems that their threat model doesn't include the adversary
> who hacks and alters the i2p2.i2p website or an evil operator of that
> site (although I guess that such an entity could also backdoor i2p
> anyway).

hosts.txt is not automatically fetched — it is bundled with I2P
package, and can be extended manually by the user via several
“redirect” services that are automatically used for a name that's not
in hosts.txt. E.g., when hiddenchan.i2p is put into browser URL, the
local I2P proxy, seeing that the domain is unknown, redirects to one
of the services (located in .i2p namespace), resulting in an offer to
confirm the eepSite public key (which is shown) to be added to
hosts.txt (or just the current session).

--
Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte
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