[Well, I already got my first bit of automated spam from the last post, so I might as well reply again.] On Sat, 16 Jun 2018 20:34:03 -0700 Chelsea Holland Komlo <me@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > As you pointed out, this project is no longer being actively > maintained. While someone on the Tor Browser development team can > answer more thoroughly, my understanding is that the original > maintainer moved on from working on this project. The Tor development > teams are quite small, so (like many open source projects) there are > more projects than people to support them. Essentially, yes. TLDR: I do not have the resources to dedicate to maintaining this, and in the long term the project should be replaced by a correctly re-designed Tor Browser that can sandbox itself anyway. In a more concrete terms, the "correct" thing to do would be for a non-trivial amount of work to be put into making Tor Browser support better isolation and sandboxing on it's own, rather than someone be stuck with trying to retrofit it to do things that the current design and architecture are ill suited to doing. Till something like that happens, a large amount of time, effort and code will be spent on replicating existing functionality such as the launcher, updater and configuration interface. This requires extensive changes to the existing Tor Browser design. As an example of what would be required, M. Finkel's design proposal[0] describes the steps required to change the Tor Browser architecture to something that is less nightmarish to sandbox, and provides better component isolation. As far as I am aware, there is no one working on that either. There are other fundamental unresolved questions specific to Linux sandboxing (eg: X11, D-Bus) that need to be resolved in a user-friendly manner (eg: blocking all of D-Bus a la `sandboxed-tor-browser` is unacceptable for mass adoption), but the better isolation brought on by the architectural change on it's own would be an improvement over a vanilla Tor Browser install, and it would let whoever is working on such things, focus on such things, rather than being forced to re-implement large parts of Tor Browser. Regards, -- Yawning Angel [0]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tbb-dev/2018-January/000743.html
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