Re: [tor-dev] Designing and implementing improved circuit-setup protocol [was: GSoC 2011]

[George Kadianakis <desnacked@xxxxxxxxx>]

Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>               <SNIP: asn: Tidying up the thread a bit>
> On Wed, Mar 23, 2011 at 1:36 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> The first step in the Great Tor Crypto Migration is to add new CREATE2
>> and EXTEND2 RELAY cell types. They can be used with the existing
>> circuit-extension handshake and link protocol initially, but will be
>> extensible to support new ones.
>>
>> Further steps, all independent of each other:
>>
>> * Add 128-byte and 2048-byte RELAY cells and a circuit-configuration
>> Âcell, initially to allow the client to change the cell size to be
>> Âused on a circuit.
>>
>> * Refactor Tor's cryptographic primitive abstractions to accommodate
>> Âpublic-key encryption primitives, public-key signature primitives,
>> Âsymmetric authenticated encryption, symmetric block encryption, and
>> Âhashes.
>>
>> * Implement one or more new link protocols that do not constrain a
>> Ârelay's choice of identity key cryptosystem.
>>
>> Further mutually independent steps building on those above:
>>
>> * Modify the directory protocol and implementation to support relays
>> Âwith multiple identity keys.
>>
>> * Implement a new circuit-extension handshake (the part that involves
>> Ââonionskinsâ).
>>
>> * Implement a new circuit ciphersuite (the part that mangles cell data
>> Âso that relay A can't see what data relay C sees).
>
> Hm.  These steps all stretch pretty far beyond what's just described
> in 3.2 of xxx-crypto-migration.  I think they're probably more than we
> can promise to design before summer, and possibly more than a typical
> gsoc scope all put together.
>

This part:
>> * Implement a new circuit-extension handshake (the part that involves
>> Ââonionskinsâ).
is in the xxx-crypto-migration, and it might be worthwhile to tackle
during GSoC. I'm not sure about the BEAR/LIONESS operation (are you?),
but if we are to design the new CREATE2 cells and we indeed don't
like the current way of passing DH paramaters around, maybe we should
find another protocol to do it.

Of course, Robert's other ideas are holy and everything, but I think
we should keep our goals humble so that we can produce an algorithmic
implementation plan which will allow us to try to predict an
implementation timeframe and see how many ideas we can fit into this
GSoC project.

For example, things that definitely must be done are: 
- Implement CREATE2 cells aiming to:
  * Upgrade onion keys.
  * Upgrade DH group
  * Upgrade hash function.
- Implement EXTEND2 cells aiming to:
  * Remove length limit, so as to be able to carry the new onion-skins and
    identity key fingerprints.
Of course all these, while having in mind the upgradability of
our design (ie. being versatile wrt the identity key)

Then we can move on to:
- Design a new onion-skin protocol.
- Play with some of Robert's ideas above.
- Touch the relay protocol.
'till the GSoC bell rings.  

What are your priorities on this project?
 
>>> I'm also a little concerned about the interaction of 3.2 and 3.3
>>> ("Relay crypto") : I'll be surprised if it turns out that we can
>>> design a good circuit extend protocol without thinking about the
>>> countours of a new relay protocol. Â(Not that you'd have to build both
>>> at once, but we should think about them all as we design.)
>>
>> It's actually the other way around -- we need a new EXTEND cell before
>> we can use a new link protocol. Â(Otherwise, we would have to build in
>> a covert channel (i.e. a backdoor for people who want to block Tor by
>> handshake) in the new link protocol to indicate client and server link
>> protocol versions, and that really *really* sucks.)
>
> I'm talking about the stuff in 3.3: the relay protocol, where we
> process cells.  Link protocol stuff is 3.1.
>
> Also, I'm talking about *design order*, not *implementation order*:
> The different parts of the Tor protocol are not sufficiently
> orthogonal that we can do them independently.  Thus, we need to get
> most of the design changes sketched out before we can be reasonably
> say that any part of the redesign does what the other parts need.
>
>
>>> Maybe we should get a protocol sketch together this week if the app is
>>> due April 8.
>>
>> Yes. ÂI have the EXTEND2 cell draft written; I bogged down on writing
>> explanatory text (I thought I didn't have enough in the draft, but
>> didn't know what to add).
>>
>>

Sharing is caring!

>>> Either way, I think this might be drifting into design work, so if
>>> there are no objections, I'd suggest that we follow up on the tor-dev
>>> mailing list. :)
>>
>> Good idea.
>>
>>
>> Robert Ransom
>>
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