Re: [tor-dev] Brainstorming ideas for controller features for improved testing; want feedback

[Jeff Burdges <burdges@xxxxxxxxx>]

I could imagine an “onion token” variant of ephemeral hidden services in which the person who initiates the connection does not know what they’re connecting to, like sending a message to a mailbox.  Example :

Alice wants Bob to send her a message asynchronously by anonymously dropping it into a numbered mailbox system, but Alice only wants to check one mailbox for all her contacts, so she does not want Bob to be able to reveal her mailbox. 

Rough outline : 
- Alice gives bob a “token” that contains a bunch of pre-encrypted tor extends, data, etc. frames and some additional data such as symmetric keys.  Alice goes offline. 
- Bob sends Alice’s mailbox a message by building a circuit to a specified machine, encrypting each of the frames supplied by Alice for all of his circuit except the endpoint because Alice already did that encryption, and sending them.  
- These frames continue building a circuit from that endpoint to wherever Alice wants it to go. 
- Bob encrypts his data frames using first the additional data supplied by Alice so that they can traverse this longer circuit that he only understands, and then encrypts those for the portion of the circuit he understands. 
- Alice logs back in, contacts the mailbox hidden service, and retrieves her messages, including Bob’s message. 

Optional : 
- Amongst the frames Bob needs to use to set up the circuit might be one that causes re-incryption so that even if an adversary hacked both Bob and the mailbox system they cannot search the mailbox system for Bob’s message. 

Of course “onion tokens” would not live forever since Alice’s token fails to describe a valid circuit if any server she selected goes down, but maybe it’s provide a nice short-term asynchronous delivery options for IM systems like Ricochet. 
	https://github.com/ricochet-im/ricochet

Best,
Jeff





On 20 Mar 2015, at 11:55, Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Hi!  I've got an end-of-month deliverable to flesh out as many good
> ideas here as I can, and I'd appreciate feedback on what kind of
> features it would be good to add to the controller protocol in order
> to better support testing.
> 
> More ideas would be most welcome.
> 
> Yes, some of these ideas are probably foolish or pointless or
> half-baked or useless or even dangerous; this is a brainstorming
> exercise, not a declaration of intent.  The goal right now is to
> generate a lot of ideas and thoughts now, and to make decisions about
> what to build later.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> IDEAS
> =====
> 
> 
> 1. Step-by-step hidden service connections
> 
>   Add the ability to create connections to hidden services step by
>   step, to best
> 
>   What's necessary here is commands to:
>      * Establish a rendezvous point on a given circuit.
>      * Construct and send an introduce2 cell on a given circuit.
>      * Realize that a rendezvous circuit has been constructed.
> 
> 
> 2. Send a single cell on a circuit
> 
>   (TESTING ONLY)
> 
>   For fuzzing and low-level testing purposes, it would be handy to be
>   able to send a single cell on a tor circuit.
> 
>   This might be better to expose via a low-level modular API than via
>   the control port.
> 
> 3. Intercept cell by cell on a circuit
> 
>   (TESTING ONLY)
> 
>   For fuzzing, testing, and debugging purposes, it might be handy for
>   a controller to be able to observe data cell by cell on a circuit of
>   interest.
> 
>   This might be better to expose via a low-level modular API than via
>   the control port.
> 
> 4. Send a single cell on a connection.
> 
>   (TESTING ONLY)
> 
>   As 2, but for connections.  Note that we might even, for testing,
>   expose this at a sub-cell level.
> 
> 5. Intercept all cells on a connection
> 
>   (TESTING ONLY)
> 
>   As 2, but for connections.
> 
> 6. Plug-in to handle a relay or other command.
> 
>   Right now, all Tor's features need to be baked into Tor; it's not
>   easy to write extensions.  We could change that by having the
>   controller able to intersect particular relay or extension commands
>   and act accordingly.  This could be used for prototyping new
>   features, etc.
> 
> 7. Force a given protocol on a given connection
> 
>   We could add a feature to restrict what protocols can be negotiated
>   on a given connection we create.  This could help us better test our
>   protocols for interoperatbility.
> 
> 8. Examine fine-grained connection detail.
> 
>   There are many data available for a given connection (such as
>   fine-grained TLS information) that are not currently exposed on the
>   GETINFO interface.  We could make most of this available for testing,
>   pending security analysis.
> 
> 9. Examine cache in detail
> 
>   In the past we've seen crazy issues with our descriptor caching
>   code.  It might be good to expose for testing information about
>   where exactly descriptors are stored, what attributes are set on
>   them, and so on.  We could also expose events for cache compaction
>   and discarded expired descriptors.
> 
> 10. Fetch literal documents
> 
>   Currently there's no way for a controller to ask Tor to download a
>   given descriptor or microdescriptor or networkstatus.  That could
>   change.
> 
> 11. OOM stats
> 
>   To resist out-of-memory attacks, we track our memory usage and kill
>   off circuits as needed when memory gets low.  We could expose the
>   memory thresholds and current sizes via one or more controller
>   commands.
> 
> 12. Timeout values
> 
>   Tor has a truly huge variety of internal timers to ensure that given
>   periodic events happen enough; we could expose those, and (TESTING
>   ONLY) allow controllers to adjust them or trigger their corresponding
>   events.
> 
> 13. Detailed connection debugging info
> 
>   Current connection events expose only large-scale state changes in
>   connections; we could instead expose every state transition at the
>   cell-by-cell handshake level.
> 
> 14. Detailed circuit debugging info
> 
>   As 13 but for circuits.
> 
> 15. Halt main loop except for control layer.
> 
>   (TESTING ONLY)
> 
>   For inspection/debugging purposes, it might be clever to have Tor be
>   able to freeze itself, except for the control layer, and let the
>   controller inquire about information.
> 
>   This presents implementation challenges, and is probably not a great
>   idea to do before a _big_ refactoring.
> 
> 16. Service a single connection
> 
>   (TESTING ONLY)
> 
>   Currently controllers can disable circuit construction or stream
>   attachment, and do them manually.  We might also do this for
>   connections, allowing a testing controller to trace what Tor does
>   cell by cell on a single connection.
> 
> 17. All rephist data
> 
>    There are many data about history and usage in rephist.c (which
>    stands for 'reputation and history!').  We could expose them, to let
>    us better test them.  Some of this might be useful for Seth
>    (previously arm) users.
> 
>    Spec: This would use GETINFO extensions, and probably some new
>    events.
> 
> 18. All ratelim data
> 
>    Sometimes our rate-limiting code can get wonky.  It would be great
>    to expose it to Tor controllers in order to help ensure it's
>    behaving correctly.  This would include send/receive windows and bw
>    stuff.
> 
>    Spec: This would use GETINFO extensions, and probably some new
>    events.
> 
> 19. All accounting data
> 
>    As 17, but for hibernate.c, which performs bandwidth accounting.
> 
> 20. All guard transitions
> 
>    Our guard node state logic is very complicated, and much in need of
>    testing and refactoring.  Exposing more state transitions and guard
>    selection transitions to the controller might help.  (We have a
>    "GUARD" event now, but it is a bit out of sync with the main
>    implementation)
> 
> 21. All key transitions
> 
>    We could generate events every time we change keys, and (TESTING
>    ONLY) allow a controller to time-out a key early.
> 
> 22. Examine mux settings
> 
>    (TESTING ONLY)
> 
>    The circuitmux code that we use to decide which cell to send next is
>    very complex; it would be good to expose its thinking and
>    decisionmaking to a testing controller for better observation.
> 
> 23. Examine pathbias settings
> 
>    Our pathbias code is also complex, and a bit flakier than the
>    circuitmux code.  We could do for it as with 22 above.
> 
> 24. Examine cpuworker queues
> 
>    As of 0.2.6, we have a new cpuworker infrastructure that better
>    sends data to worker threads, but not much visibility into how well
>    it's working.  Exposing some information about this to the
>    controller could help us tune better.
> 
> 25. All geoip data
> 
>    As 17, but for any geoip information we aren't currently exporting.
> 
> 26. Replay detection
> 
>    For hidden service security (and maybe eventually for secure ntor Y
>    reuse) we have to keep replay caches to prevent us from being
>    tricked into handling the same value twice.  We don't expose the
>    load on these caches to the controller, however.  And we could, to
>    help us better tune them into using a good memory/error-rate
>    trade-off.
> 
> 27. Hidden service intropoint changes, desc changes, uploads
> 
>    Many hidden service transitions currently generate no events.  We
>    could at minimum generate events for changed inroduction points,
>    changed hidden service descriptors, uploading our own HS descriptor.
> 
> 28. Descriptor uploads.
> 
>    We have an event for when our descriptor has changed, but not for a
>    successful upload for it.  We could fix that.
> 
> 29. Path generation logic -- expose, allow.
> 
>    Currently a controller's only visibility into path selection logic
>    is in its outputs, and in the opportunity to replace path selection
>    logic entirely.  We could expose more details about the algorithm's
>    operation in order to help better test our path selection.
> 
> 30. All PT status information.
> 
>    Pluggable transport feedback is, at present, very coarse-grained.
>    For testing we might expose more.
> 
> 31. Crypto operation counts.
> 
>    We ought to keep count of our various cryptographic operations, and
>    expose them to the controller.   This would help us know where to
>    spend our optimization efforts.
> 
> 32. Forget cached information
> 
>    To better test our download logic, it would be helpful to have a way
>    to drop items from our caches.
> 
> 
> IMPLEMENTATION NOTES:
> =====================
> 
> Not lightly does one list 31 controller improvement areas.  If we're
> hoping to do these without too much programmer time and , we need to
> take a much more principled approach to implementing controller
> commands.  For #8351 I worked on a branch called 'ticket8351' that has
> some code we could use here.
> 
> COMPATIBILITY NOTES:
> ====================
> 
> Many of the features here are ones that we might not want to promise to
> support indefinitely; we should gate them behind a USEFEATURE command,
> and maybe place them in an annex of the control spec.
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