Re: [tor-dev] Call for a big fast bridge (to be the meek backend)

[David Fifield <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 08:41:20AM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 02:02:42PM +0100, Ximin Luo wrote:
> > On 18/09/14 03:31, David Fifield wrote:
> > > Currently in the bundles we're not setting a bridge fingerprint, so
> > > relays wouldn't have to share a key.
> > > 
> > 
> > This is something to be *fixed*, not to build future components on top of.
> > 
> > Previously you mentioned that "the user could set their circuits to 4
> > hops" but I think this is a hack of a solution and we can do better,
> > by authenticating the Bridge.
> 
> I really disagree with you here :( I don't understand your point of
> view. Let's try and assume good faith.
> 
> Do you remember a couple of days ago, when I had to separate the tor
> processes for flash proxy and meek because the metrics were getting
> mixed up? That would have been *impossible* to do if there were
> hardcoded fingerprints out there in bundles. And how I recently put out
> a call for someone else to run the meek bridge? How is that transition
> supposed to work if changing the fingerprint means we suddenly and
> inexplicably break every existing client installation?
> 
> The answer surely isn't "make sure the bridge's private key never
> changes" and it isn't "anticipate every possible eventuality
> indefinitely into the future."
> 
> Can you explain what you don't like about four hops? To me it feels like
> the right thing. It wouldn't just be for meek, you know, but for all
> bridge circuits (including ordinary plain-vanilla bridges). When you're
> using a bridge you treat the first hop as unauthenticated and
> unencrypted, as if it were a SOCKS proxy or third-party VPN or any other
> circumvention proxy. You treat the first hop as not chosen by you,
> because it's not: even with BridgeDB you're just pasting in some bytes
> the web site chose for you. After your first circumvention hop, then you
> add your own three hops, notably including your own chosen guard.
> 	bridge â guard â middle â exit

Mike talked to me about this and made me understand that adding a fourth
hop is not sufficient to prevent certain attacks. In other words, you
need to TLS to be good, because Tor's current crypto doesn't have a
per-hop MAC. Namely,
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14937#comment:17 .

So we'll add fingerprint for the meek bridges after all. Upgrading or
migrating bridges will require more care, basically the same as what
exists for obfs3 etc. now (when you want to change a bridge, you need to
keep the old one running for a while in order to give people time to
upgrade, and in case of a major error like private key disclosure, just
accept that many users will be cut off when you change the fingerprint).

David
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