Hey hey, In summary of the breakaway group we had last Saturday on post-quantum cryptography in Tor, there were a few potentially good ideas I wrote down, just in case they didn't make it into the meeting notes: * A client should be able to configure "I require my entire circuit to have PQ handshakes" and "I require at least one handshake in my circuits to be PQ". (Previously, we had only considered having consensus parameters, in order to turn the feature on e.g. once 20% of relays supported the new handshake method.) * Using stateful hash-based signatures to sign descriptors and/or consensus documents, and (later) if state has been lost or compromised, then request the last such document submitted to regain state (probably skipping over all the leaves of the last used node in the tree, or the equivalent, to be safe). (This requires more concrete design analysis, including the effects of the large size of hash-based signatures on the directory bandwidth usage, probably in a proposal or longer write up, should someone awesome decides to research this idea further. :) Thanks to everyone involved in the breakaway group, and I apologise, but I don't actually remember all the attendants off the top of my head. If either of these were your idea, please message me off-list and I'll ensure you're credited in the eventual proposal(s)/documentation. Best regards, -- ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft _________________________________________________________ OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
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