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Re: [tor-dev] A new idea for email encryption on tor



Well, you do. It is stored on your local machine only.
--Keifer


On Wed, Dec 2, 2020 at 1:10 PM Wisdom With Rahul <rahulbhatia172@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
This idea is interesting but who owns all the keys?

Thanks and regards!


   

On Fri 13 Nov, 2020, 6:49 AM Keifer Bly, <keifer.bly@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Well, the mechanism is that it overwrites the key ever time, so each message has its own unique key, also the receiver needs to verify the key file with the built in tool to be able to use it. So an attacker does not know this the only way to get this information is from the person that created the message as the need when the OS originally generated the message, not when it was uploaded as an attachment somewhere. That's what I was thinking. I will look into the communities suggested, thanks very much. --Keifer 


On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 1:27 PM Santiago Torres-Arias <santiago@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 11:19:44AM -0800, Keifer Bly wrote:
> Hi there,

Hello,

> So I have a new email encryption system which requires that the user has
> the specific key file generated for a message rather than the password,
> specifically this software generates a unique key file for a specific
> message every time a message is created. The user then enters the date and
> time the message was created. Without the original key file the message
> can't be opened;
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0W7OVdNrOA
>
> Here is a video showing the software. I've built it for Windows and Mac OS.
> I was wondering if this could be implemented in tor. I think it would be an
> interesting idea for a tor based email system to make the messages
> unrecoverable after use.

I'm not a tor-dev, so I can't comment on the interest, but it appears to
me that the value added of this idea (basically, using time to seed a
PRF/KDF) is very little. All in all, using time to seed keys is not the
best idea. It also seems to be on top of PGP, so I'm pretty convinced
this doesn't provide perfect forward-secrecy unless you're layering any
sort of session key ratcheting mechanism yourself.

I think the goal is laudable, but I suggest getting a little bit more
involved in cryptography engineering communities to see learn, develop
and eventually help change the status quo.

Cheers!
-S
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