Re: [tor-dev] Discussion on the crypto migration plan of the identity keys of Hidden Services

[David Vorick <david.vorick@xxxxxxxxx>]

Why are so many bits necessary? Isn't 128bits technically safe against brute force? At 256 bits you are pretty much safe from any volume of computational power that one could fathom within this century. The only real danger is a new computational model that is nondeterministic or something crazy like that. I feel like what exists currently (from a quantity of bits standpoint) is more than sufficient.

On Fri, May 17, 2013 at 11:09 AM, adrelanos <adrelanos@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

George Kadianakis:
> Thoughts?

Can you make .onion domains really long and therefor really safe against
brute force?

Or have an option for maximum key length and a weaker default if common
CPU's are still too slow? I mean, if you want to make 2048 bit keys the
default because you feel most hidden services have CPU's which are too
slow for 4096 bit keys, then use 2048 bit as default with an option to
use the max. of 4096 bit.

Bonus point: Can you make the new implementation support less painful
updates (anyone or everyone) when the next update will be required?
(forward compatibility)
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