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El 30/04/14 17:06, Christopher Baines
escribió:
On 08/10/13 06:52, Christopher Baines wrote:I have been looking at doing some work on Tor as part of my degree, and more specifically, looking at Hidden Services. One of the issues where I believe I might be able to make some progress, is the Hidden Service Scaling issue as described here [1]. So, before I start trying to implement a prototype, I thought I would set out my ideas here to check they are reasonable (I have also been discussing this a bit on #tor-dev). The goal of this is two fold, to reduce the probability of failure of a hidden service and to increase hidden service scalability.Previous threads on this subject: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-October/005556.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-October/005674.html I have now implemented a prototype, for one possible design of how to allow distribution in hidden services. While developing this, I also made some modifications to chutney to allow for the tests I wanted to write. In short, I modified tor such that: - The services public key is used in the connection to introduction points (a return to the state as of the v0 descriptor) - multiple connections for one service to an introduction point is allowed (previously, existing were closed) - tor will check for a descriptor when it needs to establish all of its introduction points, and connect to the ones in the descriptor (if it is available) - Use a approach similar to the selection of the HSDir's for the selection of new introduction points (instead of a random selection)an taack involvin I appreciate your work since Hidden services are really bad. Hard to reach ATM sometimes. But ... how you do this in details? Sorry but walking over your sources could be challenging if I don't know the original codebase you used and is gonna take more time than if I just ask you. I also can't test as I don't have enough resources/know how/time.- Attempt to reconnect to an introduction point, if the connection is lost I am worried about an attack coming from evil IP based on forced disconnection of the HS from the IP. I don't know if this is possible but I am worried that if you pick a new circuit randomly could be highly problematic. Lets say I am NSA and I own 10% of the routers and disconnecting your HS from an IP I control, if you select a new circuit randomly, even if the probabilities are low, eventually is a matters of time until I force you to use an specific circuit from those convenient to me in order to have a possible circuit(out of many) that transfers your original IP as metadata through cooperative routers I own and then do away with the anonymity of the hidden service. The big question I have is what is the probability with current Tor network size of this happening? If things are like I describe, is a matter of seconds or thousand of years? With chutney, I added support for interacting with the nodes through Stem, I also moved the control over starting the nodes to the test, as this allows for more complex behaviour. Currently the one major issue is that using an approach similar to the HSDir selection means that introduction points suffer from the same issue as HSDir's currently [1]. I believe any satisfactory solution to the HSDir issue would resolve this problem also. One other thing of note, tor currently allows building circuits to introduction points, through existing introduction points, and selecting introduction points on circuits used to connect to other introduction points. These two issues mean that a failure in one introduction point, can currently cause tor to change two introduction points. (I am not saying this needs changing, but you could adjust the circuit creation, to prevent some extra work later if a failure occurs). Any comments regarding the above would be welcome. I have put the code for this up, but it should not be used for anything other than private testing (and will not work properly outside of chutney at the moment anyway). The modifications to tor can be found in the disths branch of: git://git.cbaines.net/tor.git The modifications and additional tests for chutney can be found in the disths branch of: git://git.cbaines.net/chutney.git To run the tests against the new code, you would do something along the lines of: git clone -b disths git://git.cbaines.net/tor.git git clone -b disths git://git.cbaines.net/chutney.git cd tor ./autogen.sh ./configure make clean all cd ../chutney git submodule update --init export PATH=../tor/src/or:../tor/src/tools/:$PATH ls networks/hs-* | xargs -n 1 ./chutney configure ls networks/hs-* | xargs -n 1 ./chutney --quiet start The last command should yield some output similar to: networks/hs-dual-intro-fail-3 PASS networks/hs-intro-fail-2 PASS networks/hs-intro-fail-3 PASS networks/hs-intro-select-2 PASS networks/hs-start-3 PASS networks/hs-stop-3 PASS networks/hs-tripple-intro-fail-3 PASS 1: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8244 |
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