On 21 Nov (16:26:31), Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote: > > > On 21 Nov 2015, at 05:38, David Goulet <dgoulet@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > I know that we have sometimes 1, 4, 5, 6 or 7 hops circuit but the general case > > is considered here and we have no stats on how frequent those unusual circuits > > are. > > > When I tested hidden service path lengths: > > Most clients cannibalized a 3-hop path for their directory, introduction point, and rendezvous circuits. So 4-hop paths may be quite frequent on the client side of hidden services. > > On the server side, it depends on how busy the hidden service is - whether it has any preemptively built paths to cannibalize or not. > If so, it's side is typically 4 hops, if not, it is 3. Indeed, I bet cannibalization happens more often then we think thus ending up with a 4 hops circuit to either your IP or RP. > > It would be great to have some stats for typical path lengths, is there an open ticket for this, or should I create one? That would help us have a better estimate of network capacity for sure but I wonder if it worth the efforts versus having a real privacy oriented statistics gathering system that could give us a much more accurate number of the used and unused capacity of relays. In other words, question comes down to should we put effort in a bigger larger system or continue cherry-picking small stats here and there? (huge work once vs small/medium-ish effort multiple time :) Thanks! David > > Tim > > Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) > > teor2345 at gmail dot com > PGP 968F094B > > teor at blah dot im > OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F > > _______________________________________________ > tor-dev mailing list > tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
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