On 06 Nov (15:44:26), AntiTree wrote: > Hey David, > > Are there any ways of revoking a service's key and should it be included as > a control port function? For example, in the case that the master key is > kept offline but the host and its descriptor signing key are compromised, > the box could be run for a period of time(?) until the keys expire and need > to be re-signed. That window could be forcefully closed remotely with a > revocation that reports that key as compromised. I don't know how big that > window is so I don't know how big of a risk it ends up being. To have a revocation system like that, we need some sort of mechanism that remembers revoked keys at maybe the directory level of as a complete new entity that keeps a registry of those. We do not have a way to do that nor a proposal for it :S... David > > @ > > On Mon, Nov 6, 2017 at 9:59 AM David Goulet <dgoulet@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Hi everyone, > > > > Attached is the proposal draft for the hidden service v3 contro port > > specification. > > > > The idea with this proposal is to _only_ extend the current commands and > > events to v3. Nothing new is added. We can think of more things to add > > after > > but for now, I wanted a baseline to start with that is only extending what > > exists. > > > > Any kind of feedbacks is welcome! :) > > > > Cheers! > > David > > > > -- > > Zu3IyL4LcdnKNkQIZqEqaTNUapUEJFdEcN02dPwo5FQ= > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-dev mailing list > > tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-dev mailing list > tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev -- 1ThD0Y7lJWfAN3qxos27iPGUdHQS5sZ4kMwlov3un5k=
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