On Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:31:15 -0600
John Brooks <john.brooks@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
[snip]
> >
> > Have you considered all the implications?
>
> Maybe weâve missed some - what implications are you thinking of, that
> arenât addressed in the proposal?
I have two objections to this, one political, one technical:
* (The political objection) While this is "cool" and probably(?)
"funded", it seems like a poor thing to work on in terms of
developmental priority when there are other things Hidden Service
related that need a lot of developer attention, primarily in making
the existing HSes more resilient against Nation State level
adversaries (Eg: Prop. 224).
* (The technical objection) It is overly easy for assholes[0] to censor
Single Onion Services due to:
itâs possible for the previous relay to guess the service youâre
connecting to
While such a censor would only be able to deny service to clients as
a fraction of their relay(s) consensus weight, it's still something
that probably should get consideration.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
[0]:https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-July/007167.html
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