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Re: [tor-dev] Draft Proposal: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting
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I disagree. can you describe how exactly? What exactly can be gamed,
if we use the protection described by me? It will provide the same
security as directory authorities already have for voting about
relays. It's true that ultimately anything can be gamed, but if it's
not trivial to do or likely to happen this is an option we rather have
than not have.
>> Quote: I'm not a big fan of automated systems that ban
>> authorities as it may get false positives and it may be gamed
>> and/or attacked.
>>
>> An alternative solution is to make the voting a two-step system:
>> first you publish the sha256 hash of your vote, then a few
>> minutes later you publish the actual vote. If they didn't match,
>> disregard the vote.
>>
>> It may be a bit more work to implement, but should prove
>> valuable in the long run as it mitigates most cases of
>> authorities trying to manipulate the consensus.
>>
>> Tom
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