On Wed, 2016-09-28 at 19:45 -0400, Jesse V wrote: > I am curious, what is your issue with the subdomains? Are you > referring to enumerating all subdomains, or simply being able > to confirm that a particular subdomain exists? Yes, confirmation of subdomans can become a problem in some contexts where GNS gets discussed as a possible solution. If I know that blabla.onion exists as a website, then it's good that I can learn that www.blabla.onion exists as a website. If otoh I know that blabla.zkey is a GNS record representing a Bob's contact list, then it's bad that I can learn that alice.blabla.zkey exists. Jeff p.s. In my message, I suggested roughly : Let P = p G be a elliptic curve point so that P.onion is a hidden service with abbreviated URL x. If y is a domain name element string, then y.P.onion and y.x point to Q.onion where Q = H(s,P) * P for some hash function H mapping into the scalars. And q = H(s,P) p is the private key for that HS record. Now this Q.onion HS record could simply forward users to another HS record with a private key not controlled by p. This means the owner of x & p can make the HSDirs forward requests in a verifiable way. The downside is more HS records. This could help create a diversity of naming solutions whose TLDs (x above) are controlled by different authorities. It's not helpful if you want x to be controlled in some distributed way though. In fact, I suppose most Tor name service proposals would be distributed, giving my idea only very limited usefulness.
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