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Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 334: A flag to mark Relays as middle-only



Hi,

I have an updated proposal which addresses your concerns, along with David Goulet's comments on GitLab.

On 2021-09-07 12:47, s7r wrote:
Hi Neel,

Please add a "MOTIVATION" section and explain in detail why is this
needed for the network/heath team and how will it improve things? Also
include in the "MOTIVATION" section the following:

- Why not play with the Exit/Guard to achieve the same goal, why not
possible? what is the goal -- we need to know the goal to further
discuss this.

I have an updated proposal which addresses your concerns, along with David Goulet's comments on GitLab.

- It's something at Directory Authority Level only? So the client /
relay operator has no decision whatsoever for this flag? What are the
tie breakers or based on what is this assigned?

This is something assigned at the dirauth-level.

- How will this work in a wonderful feature I am dreaming of where all
the relays are Exits and maybe we make walking onions working?

I believe it shouldn't affect these scenarios, but have mentioned we should look out for them.

P.S. Rendezvous point is NOT a less powerful position (at least from
an onion service server/operator point of view), unless you are using
vanguards plugin by Mike with rendguard component activated. Because
it's always chosen by the client connecting to the onion service, and
we should assume the client is always ~LE~ evil. Trust me on this :)

I have also updated this to be a strictly Middle-only flag, and am not giving rendezvous capabilities to MiddleOnly relays.

Sorry about this, but I have taken more-or-less a so-called "break" from Tor development for a while. I am technically a volunteer, and my $DAYJOB is at "Big Tech" (don't judge, that's where I found work).

I also got FreeBSD "commit bit" (not every Tor developer uses Debian) which took time away from Tor volunteer efforts. I am only getting back to Tor development as of the past week or two, so I need to refresh my memory.

Going back, this update also completes the missing paragraph reported by Ian, that seemed to miss me in the original proposal.

-Neel Chauhan
Filename: 334-middle-only-flag.txt
Title: A dirauth flag to mark Relays as Middle-only
Author: Neel Chauhan
Created: 2021-09-07
Status: Open

1. Introduction

  The Health Team often deals with a large number of relays with an incorrect
  configuration (e.g. not all relays in MyFamily), or needs validation that
  requires contacting the relay operator. It is desirable to put the said
  relays in a less powerful position, such as a middle only flag that prevents
  a relay from being used in more powerful positions like an entry guard or an
  exit relay. [1]

1.1. Motivation

  The proposed middle-only flag is needed by the Health Team to prevent
  misconfigured relays from being used in positions capable of deanonymizing
  users while the team evaluates the relay's risk to the network. An example
  of this scenario is when a guard and exit relay run by the same operator
  has an incomplete MyFamily, and the same operator's guard and exit are used
  in a circuit.

  The reason why we won't play with the Guard and Exit flags or weights to
  achieve the same goal is because even if we were to reduce the guard and
  exit weights of a misconfigured relay, it could keep some users at risk of
  deanonymization. Even a small fraction of users at risk of deanonymization
  isn't something we should aim for.

  One case we could look out for is if all relays are exit relays (unlikely),
  or if walking onions are working on the current Tor network. This proposal
  should not affect those scenarios, but we should watch out for these cases.

2. The MiddleOnly Flag

  We propose a consensus flag MiddleOnly. As mentioned earlier, relays will be
  assigned this flag from the directory authorities.

  What this flag does is that a relay must not be used as an entry guard or
  exit relay. This is to prevent issues with a misconfigured relay as described
  in Section 1 (Introduction) while the Health Team assesses the risk with the
  relay.

3. Implementation details

  The MiddleOnly flag can be assigned to relays whose IP addresses are
  configured at the directory authority level, similar to how the BadExit flag
  currently works. In short, if a relay's IP is designated as middle-only, it
  must assign the MiddleOnly flag, otherwise we must not assign it.

  Relays which haven't gotten the Guard or Exit flags yet but have IP addresses
  that aren't designated as middle-only in the dirauths must not get the
  MiddleOnly flag. This is to allow new entry guards and exit relays to enter
  the Tor network, while giving relay administrators flexibility to increase
  and reduce bandwidth, or change their exit policy.

3.1. Client Implementation

  Clients should interpret the MiddleOnly flag while parsing relay descriptors
  to determine whether a relay is to be avoided for non-middle purposes. If
  a client parses the MiddleOnly flag, it must not use MiddleOnly-designated
  relays as entry guards or exit relays.

3.2. MiddleOnly Relay Purposes

  If a relay has the MiddleOnly flag, we do not allow it to be used for the
  following purposes:

   * Entry Guard

   * Exit

   * Onion Service Rendevous Point

   * Onion Service Intro Point

   * Onion Service HSDir

   * Fallback Directories

  The reason for this is to prevent a misconfigured relay from being used
  in places where they may know about the client directly. This is in case
  certain misconfigured relays are used to deanonymize clients.

4. Consensus Method

  We also propose a new consensus method 32, which is to only use this flag if
  and when all authorities understand the flag and agree on it. This is because
  the MiddleOnly flag impacts path selection for clients.

5. Citations

  [1] - https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40448
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