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Re: Tor client performance (was Re: URGENT: patch needed ASAP for authority bug)



Thus spake Olaf Selke (olaf.selke@xxxxxxxxxxxx):

> Roger Dingledine wrote:
> > 
> > Well, the problem central to this thread is "Lately, certain relays are
> > receiving way more *connections* than they can handle, and it's not
> > only the relays at the very top of the bandwidth charts." So I think
> > it's very relevant.
> 
> yep! Sorry to bother you again with this number-of-connection issue. Tor
> on my network status machine is a non exit relay with a rather
> restrictive bandwidth policy of "BandwidthRate 50 KB" and
> "BandwidthBurst 100 KB". Even this tiny middleman relay holds 10000+ tcp
> connections. Probably this number of connections will kill most routers
> used in residential environment.

Are you certain this middleman relay did not get assigned the guard
flag? Please see the blue "Consensus" column in:
http://metrics.torproject.org/consensus-health.html

If you do not have the guard flag, then we have a serious issue on our
hands. Either Andrew is right about there being a super-abundance of
out-of-spec clients, or the network as a whole is experiencing a tcp
connect flood attack.

Providing us with the name/idhex of the relay would be even better,
because we could then look back in the descriptor history to see if
you ever had the Guard flag.

This data point would help us a lot to determine the source of this
issue.

-- 
Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fscked.org evil labs

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