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Re: [tor-relays] Relays vulnerable to OpenSSL bug: Please upgrade

To: tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,Moritz Bartl <moritz@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Relays vulnerable to OpenSSL bug: Please upgrade
From: Elrippo <elrippo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 08 Apr 2014 22:15:46 +0200
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Hy community :(

It seems, that we are seriously f##### since 14 MAR 2012 with the release of the openssl 1.0.1 branch until yesterday!!!

Affected services which used these libraries are enormous. ftps, https, imaps, smtp over ssl, xmpp, and so on, and so on.

It makes me really feel sad and angry that all efforts to stay secured, especially over TOR, on encryptions were compromised by such a programing mistake that caused this zerodayexploit.

My users and me are virtually crying our hearts out...

Good night, over and out,
elrippo.

On 08. April 2014 06:11:01 MESZ, Moritz Bartl <moritz@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160
>
>A new OpenSSL vulnerability on 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f is out today, which
>can be used to reveal memory to a connected client or server.
>
>If you're using an older OpenSSL version, you're safe.
>
>Note that this bug affects way more programs than just Tor â expect
>everybody who runs an https webserver to be scrambling today. If you
>need strong anonymity or privacy on the Internet, you might want to
>stay
>away from the Internet entirely for the next few days while things
>settle.
>
>Here are our first thoughts on what Tor components are affected:
>
>    Clients: Tor Browser shouldn't be affected, since it uses libnss
>rather than openssl. But Tor clients could possibly be induced to send
>sensitive information like "what sites you visited in this session" to
>your entry guards. If you're using TBB we'll have new bundles out
>shortly; if you're using your operating system's Tor package you should
>get a new OpenSSL package and then be sure to manually restart your
>Tor.
>
>    Relays and bridges: Tor relays and bridges could maybe be made to
>leak their medium-term onion keys (rotated once a week), or their
>long-term relay identity keys. An attacker who has your relay identity
>key can publish a new relay descriptor indicating that you're at a new
>location (not a particularly useful attack). An attacker who has your
>relay identity key, has your onion key, and can intercept traffic flows
>to your IP address can impersonate your relay (but remember that Tor's
>multi-hop design means that attacking just one relay in the client's
>path is not very useful). In any case, best practice would be to update
>your OpenSSL package, discard all the files in keys/ in your
>DataDirectory, and restart your Tor to generate new keys.
>
>    Hidden services: Tor hidden services might leak their long-term
>hidden service identity keys to their guard relays. Like the last big
>OpenSSL bug, this shouldn't allow an attacker to identify the location
>of the hidden service, but an attacker who knows the hidden service
>identity key can impersonate the hidden service. Best practice would be
>to move to a new hidden-service address at your convenience.
>
>   Directory authorities: In addition to the keys listed in the "relays
>and bridges" section above, Tor directory authorities might leak their
>medium-term authority signing keys. Once you've updated your OpenSSL
>package, you should generate a new signing key. Long-term directory
>authority identity keys are offline so should not be affected (whew).
>More tricky is that clients have your relay identity key hard-coded, so
>please don't rotate that yet. We'll see how this unfolds and try to
>think of a good solution there.
>
>    Tails is still tracking Debian oldstable, so it should not be
>affected by this bug.
>
>   Orbot looks vulnerable; we'll try to publish more details here soon.
>    It looks like most of the webservers in the
>https://www.torproject.org/ rotation need upgrades too, and maybe we'll
>need to throw away our torproject SSL web cert and get a new one â
>hopefully we'll deal with all that soon.
>
>
>
>--
>Moritz Bartl
>https://www.torservers.net/
>
>
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
>tor-relays mailing list
>tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

- --
We don't bubble you, we don't spoof you ;)
Keep your data encrypted!
Log you soon,
your Admin
elrippo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Encrypted messages are welcome.
0x84DF1F7E6AE03644

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References:
- [tor-relays] Relays vulnerable to OpenSSL bug: Please upgrade
  - From: Moritz Bartl

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