nusenu: >> FWIW: we kicked a bunch of relays out of the network today which might >> or might not contain any of those, hard to tell. > > Please publish the relay fingerprints that directory authorities remove, otherwise > only the malicious entities get to learn and improve since they see the > removal in their logfiles anyway but we tor users don't get to learn anything > because it remains largely invisible to us. That's a bit tricky because potential *other* attackers might be able to learn things from our rejects if we are not careful. On the other hand, transparency is very valuable, in particular in the bad-relays area which is one of the least transparent areas in Tor (for good reasons, though, see Roger's mail[1] from a couple of years back explaining the dilemma we are in). That said I think we could try publishing, with some delay, the fingerprints we reject after seeing them involved in attacks. For instance, we could have a monthly list of those fingerprints which we publish, as a general rule of thumb[2], at the beginning of the following month. I think I'll find a place in our network-health wiki for that. Thanks for the suggestion, Georg [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034219.html [2] There might be exceptions to that rule, though, for instance if an attack starts at the end of the month and is still on-going during the begin of the new one, or if we think the rejection is too close to the end of that month and thus the delay I talked about above is too short. In both and other cases those fingerprints will then get picked up at the begin of the month following after that. > Roger's email from 2020-10-31 is a good example that made further investigations possible. > > kind regards, > nusenu > > >
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